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Thinking about our possible selves can entail thinking about self-related imagined future events. 
When remembering and imagining, individuals can use both 1
st
 person (field) and 3
rd
 person 
(observer) perspectives. There is currently a paucity of research examining the visual perspectives 
of episodic future thoughts that represent possible selves. We hypothesised that temporally distant 
self-images would elicit more observer perspectives in episodic thoughts than temporally near self-
images and current self-images. Utilising a repeated measures design, sixty-eight undergraduate 
students completed IAM, I Will Be near and I Will Be far conditions (Rathbone et al., 2011) to 
generate self-images and their related episodic thoughts. It was found that episodic qualities were 
reliably affected by different self-images. Specifically, observer perspective predilections increased 
with future temporal distance. Findings are discussed in relation to self-continuity with 
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INTRODUCTION 
Our autobiographical memories have been proposed as intrinsically related to the self (Self 
Memory System, Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000), playing an important role in how we develop 
and maintain our personal identity (Wilson & Ross, 2003). In particular, spatio-temporally specific 
episodic memories, with their intimate sense of re-experiencing the past may have a unique 
relationship with our sense of self (Conway, 2005, 2009; Klein & Nichols, 2012; Rathbone, Moulin 
& Conway, 2008; Tulving, 1972, 2002; Wheeler, Stuss & Tulving, 1997). Recent studies have 
highlighted how the episodic memory system enables humans to generate episodic future thoughts 
(EFTs) - mentally imagining events that may occur in one’s personal future (Atance & O’Neill, 
2001; see also 2016 Special Issue in Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology). Although much 
research has focussed on episodic and mnemonic characteristics of future thought (e.g., Berntsen & 
Bohn, 2010; D’Argembeau & Van der Linden, 2006), with rare exceptions (Chessel, Rathbone, 
Souchay et al., 2014; Rathbone, Salgado, Akan et al., 2016) researchers have seldom made 
conceptual or empirical links with the concept; possible selves. This study extends this small set of 
studies by, for the first time, manipulating the temporal distance of possible selves. Herein we 
explore a novel question: Is visual perspective of the future affected by how temporally distant a 
future self is from the present? 
Markus and Nurius (1986) introduced the concept of possible selves; a self-knowledge 
structure that specifies an individual’s future self. In brief, possible selves can be ideal (e.g., admired 
self, professional self) or feared (e.g., unwanted self, unsuccessful self), and arise from an 
individual’s past and present self-view. Not only are possible selves argued to affect emotion, 
attention and memory (see Markus & Nurius for a review), they have also been found to affect self-
regulatory behaviours (e.g., physical activity, see Murru & Martin Ginis, 2010). How might possible 
selves be mentally represented? We argue that one plausible candidate is episodic future thoughts. 
Fundamentally, when envisioning ourselves across time, we can use our own, 1
st
 person (field) 
perspective, or a 3
rd
 person (observer) perspective during episodic constructions (Nigro & Neisser, 
1983). Field perspectives involve looking through one’s own eyes, whilst observer perspectives 
involve looking at oneself ‘from the outside’ (Libby & Eibach, 2002). The aim of the current 
investigation was to examine the relation between visual perspectives of episodic thoughts that are 
bound to possible selves. 
The current investigation develops this line of research in two important ways: (1) It is the first 
study to use a paradigm eliciting two temporally-defined future selves; those in the near and far 
temporal distance. This departs from previous studies which did not manipulate the temporal 
distance of future selves (Rathbone et al., 2011) or only manipulated temporal distance at the event 
level (D’Argembeau & Van der Linden, 2004). (2) It uses these near and far possible selves to cue 
episodic scenarios that are thought to represent those self-images. This differs from Rathbone and 
colleagues’ (2011) study in which the temporal distance of both self-images and events were allowed 
to vary (i.e., not manipulated). By investigating the visual perspective (and some other relevant 
characteristics) of self-related events, we aim to make theoretical links between the self and 
personally-relevant future scenarios. We start from a general assumption that EFTs are important for 
simulating possible representations of what we may become in the future, and in the next sections we 
make links with relevant theoretical frameworks to inform our specific experimental hypotheses. 
 
1.1. The Relation between the Episodic Memory System and the Self 
To expand our initial proposition, if constructing episodic memories assists in representing the 
current self, then logically, EFTs (Atance & O’Neill, 2001) should assist in representing possible 
selves. Whilst most future thinking aids everyday problem solving and action planning (Stawarczyk, 
Majerus, Maj, Van der Linden & D’Argembeau, 2011), it also enables humans to imagine 
themselves or ‘play out’ novel events that might plausibly occur (Berntsen & Bohn, 2010; 
Suddendorf and Corballis, 2007). Mentally simulating such future scenarios of a possible self might 
reinforce the effects of possible selves and aid self-knowledge of one’s future in relation to one’s 
current and past self. 
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Episodic past and future thinking could be distinguished by involving the distinct systems of 
memory and imagination, respectively. The reality, however, is more nuanced. In actuality, 
remembering the past and imagining the future abilities both develop around three to four years of 
age and have common underlying cerebral bases (Suddendorf & Busby, 2005; see Schacter, Addis, et 
al., 2012 for a review). Moreover, it has been demonstrated that individuals who have greater visual 
imagery abilities have more detailed and vivid episodic memories and EFTs (D’Argembeau & Van 
der Linden, 2006), and those with trouble recalling their past typically exhibit deficits in future 
thinking (e.g., Cole, Morrison, Ohr, Pauly-Takacs & Conway, 2016; Hassabis, Kumaran, Vann & 
Maguire., 2007; Klein & Loftus & Kihlstrom, 2002). 
 The ability to engage in both past and future episodic thought is known as mental time travel 
(MTT; Suddendorf & Corballis, 1997; Wheeler et al., 1997). MTT is associated with a sense of 
subjective time (Wheeler et al., 1997), and has been conveyed as being inherently related to one’s 
sense of self (Prebble, Addis & Tippett, 2013). MTT is cognitively constructive and flexible in 
nature, indicating that the term ‘remembering-imagining system’ is appropriate (see Conway, 
Loveday & Cole, 2016). These characteristics of episodic thought are emphasised by the constructive 
episodic simulation hypothesis (CESH, Schacter & Addis, 2007), which postulates that the episodic 
memory system is intrinsically constructive, allowing recombination of memory elements (e.g., 
people, places, objects) to enable EFT. Therefore, one of MTT’s central functions could be revisiting 
one’s past self, and envisioning one’s future self.   
 
In philosophy and cognitive science, it has been argued that one’s sense of self is, in part, a by-
product of the episodic memory system (see Klein & Nichols, 2012 for a review and Prebble, Addis 
& Tippett, 2013 for a recent model): An individual may remind themselves of how determined they 
are, and have been, by recollecting their graduation day. The self, however, not only relies on 
contributions from episodic memory but also derives from semantic memory, trait self-knowledge 
being an example of the latter (Markus, 1977; Klein & Nichols, 2012; Rathbone et al., 2008).  
In Prebble, Addis & Tippett’s (2013) recent two-dimension model of sense of self, subjective 
(I-self) self-awareness and objective (me-self) self-knowledge are largely aligned with episodic and 
semantic memory respectively. The two types of self-knowledge have been known since James 
(1890): The I-self is known by virtue of a person’s feelings or sensations whereas the Me-self is 
known by virtue of one’s abstracted declarative knowledge. Similarities can be drawn with Klein’s 
(2013) theorizing on the link between the self and temporality, whereby the subjective experiencing 
associated with the I-self can be aligned with ‘lived time’ whereas the semanticised Me-self can be 
aligned with ‘known time’. Highly related, also, are the neuropsychological investigations by Coste 
and colleagues (e.g., Coste, Navarro, Vallat-Azouvi, Brami et al., 2015) evidencing the 
interconnectedness between (past and future) self-images and episodes. The second dimension 
distinguishes between the present and temporally-extended conception of self. Of the four quadrants 
of this model, our study focuses upon; objective-present self, objective temporally-extended self and 
subjective temporally-extended self (It is beyond the scope of this paper to investigate the more 
intractable subjective present self). Regarding the objective self, one can specify a ‘present’ self-
image (e.g., ‘I am a doctoral student’) and a temporally-extended future self-image (e.g., ‘I will be a 
lecturer’, see Rathbone et al., 2011). In the current investigation, we envisaged that the temporally-
extended future selves would incorporate two levels or representations; episodic possible futures 
(e.g., ‘In the first day of a new lecturing job I will see and hear the new department, whilst feeling 
equally nervous and excited’) involving the subjectively-experienced future self, and also objectively 
known future self-images (e.g., ‘I will be ambitious’). Consistent with the model and the link 
between the objective and subjective self, one study demonstrated that generating future self-images 
led to an activation of possible EFTs centred on those images (Rathbone et al., 2011). Relatedly, 
other studies have illustrated that individual tendencies (e.g., the predisposition to extract meaning 
from events) are related to a set of frequently thought about, self-defining memories (Singer & 
Blagov, 2004) and future projections (e.g. D’Argembeau et al., 2012). Theoretical and empirical 
work thus indicates that important episodic representations, held within a constructive memory 
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system, are related to, and help represent, current and possible future self-images, which are likely 
underwritten by semantic memory (Prebble et al., 2013). Theoretical contributions from Klein (2013) 
also indicate that past and future self-projections can be dissociated from non-personal past and 
future projections (e.g., what the world was like, and will be like), thus emphasising the focal nature 
of the self in its relation with past and future projection. 
Especially relevant to this work is a recent neurocognitive model – the TEDIFT model - put 
forward by La Corte and Piolino (2016). In this model, the authors consider the role of both semantic 
and episodic aspects of self-continuity, concluding that semanticised representations of oneself in the 
future (cf. objective self) are more likely to occur in far versus near temporal distances. The opposite 
is hypothesised for more subjectively-experienced episodic representations (cf. subjective self). Our 
hypotheses are in line with those outlined by La Corte and Piolino, although throughout this paper 
we make links with models that are more generally about the self, visual perspective and temporality 
with a synergistic approach.  
 
1.2. The phenomenological characteristics of MTT 
Although past and future MTT share neurocognitive processes, their phenomenological 
characteristics can differ depending on whether MTT is directed to the past or future. For example, 
memories have been demonstrated to typically have greater vividness than EFTs (e.g., Berntsen & 
Bohn, 2010; Cole & Berntsen, 2016), and the future is more often perceived as more emotionally 
positive (e.g., Rasmussen & Berntsen, 2013). As mentioned, one meaningful aspect of the self in 
MTT is visual perspective, as MTT functions in allowing events to be viewed from perspectives 
impossible to lived experience (Szpunar & Radvansky, 2016). Moreover, visual perspective is 
malleable in MTT (Libby, 2003): For example, people can experience events from both field and 
observer perspectives, and alter their perspective at will (Rice & Rubin, 2009). 
Evidence has demonstrated that field memories are commonly accompanied by more vivid 
imagery, emotional intensity (regardless of valence), sensory detail, and a greater ability to 
understand and describe one’s internal state (e.g. Berntsen & Rubin, 2006; D’Argembeau et al., 
2003; Nigro & Neisser, 1983; Pronin & Ross, 2006; Sutin & Robins, 2010). Rice and Rubin (2009) 
provided evidence indicating that field perspectives are associated with more vivid memories, 
indicating a potential reason why field perspectives are more regularly associated with ‘remember’ 
responses than observer perspectives (Piolino et al., 2006) and are less likely to occur in EFT 
(Rathbone et al., 2011). Based on this behavioural evidence from the mental time travel literature, we 
predicted that event representations of the future should typically be less vivid and less emotionally 
intense than experienced (past) event representations. 
 
1.3. The Link between temporal distance and visual perspective 
One variable of MTT, temporal distance, is known to reliably alter the phenomenological details 
of past and future MTT (D’Argembeau & Van der Linden, 2004). Recently-experienced past events 
are usually more vivid, and whether past or future oriented, temporally closer events typically 
include greater phenomenological detail than distant events (D’Argembeau & Van der Linden, 2004; 
Gamboz et al., 2010; Semin & Smith, 1999). In contrast, a decrease in vividness and an increase in 
observer perspectives are found in temporally distant memories (Rice & Rubin, 2009). One tentative 
explanation why these effects might be mirrored in future thinking is due to goal-relatedness. 
Specifically, as temporally close future events are more likely to be current-goal-related (Cole & 
Berntsen, 2016; Oyserman & James, 2011), they are more likely to be rehearsed (Cole & Berntsen, 
2016), increasing their sensory-perceptual vividness compared with distant future events. 
Consequently, we predict that temporally closer EFTs should contain greater phenomenological 
detail, and will be more frequently imagined from a field perspective. 
 
Empirical research has shown that more temporally distant memories typically include more 
observer perspectives (Rice and Rubin, 2009; Robinson & Swanson, 1993). Libby et al. (2005) 
provided evidence showing that this tendency exists because observer perspectives are superior for 
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abstracting knowledge about the self (whether perceiving continuity or change). More generally, 
Libby and Eibach (2011) developed a model in which observer perspectives are well-suited to inform 
‘top-down’ abstractions rather than field perspectives, the latter being more concrete and ‘bottom-up’ 
in nature. Based on this view (and the similarity between past and future MTT), with increasing 
future temporal distance, event representations of possible selves should be more abstractly 
experienced through the use of observer perspectives. This is in line with construal-level theory 
(Trope & Liberman, 2003, 2010) which posits that temporally near scenarios are more concrete and 
content-rich, whereas distant events lend themselves to abstract reasoning and meaning-making. 
 
1.4. The current research 
Examining possible selves by examining both self-images and their related event representations 
has two purposes. (1) With significance for human socio-cognitive processing and future behaviour 
(Markus & Nurius, 1986), it may reveal new directions in applied research concerning self-regulation 
strategies. (2) It is also an important step in understanding the self as recently conceptualised 
(Prebble, Addis & Tippett, 2013) and builds upon recent theories predicting commonalities between 
past and future thought (Conway, Loveday & Cole, 2016; Schacter & Addis, 2007).  
 
In the current study, to operationalise and measure current and future identities, we used a 
paradigm developed by Rathbone, Conway & Moulin (2011; see also Rathbone et al., 2008). In brief, 
participants complete a series of ‘I am’ and ‘I will be’ sentences (e.g., I am a mother, I will be a 
grandmother). These are then used to cue past or future events. Rathbone and colleagues (2011) 
demonstrated how MTT is temporally organised around stable (current and future) self-images, and, 
additionally, that observer perspectives were significantly more common for future than past events 
(see also Chessell et al., 2014). Although this novel cuing procedure produced important findings 
concerning the relation between self-images and MTT, the authors of these other studies did not 
differentiate events that represent near and distant future selves. Including both near future and far 
future conditions allows us to elucidate the proposed relationship between visual perspectives and 
future temporal distance, which has thus far remained underexplored.  
Specifically, previous research such as that by D’Argembeau and colleagues (2004) has shown 
differences in phenomenology depending upon the temporal distance of future events. Although 
distant events may link to distant self-images, only in this study were we able to precisely identify 
and investigate the effects of temporal distances of the future self-images. Additionally, a recent 
study from Macrae et al. (2015) tested the hypothesised association between temporal distance and 
visual perspective related to self-focused future events. However, predominant perspective taking 
was inferred through a simple letter-drawing task. Participants engaged in only one, experimenter-
provided, episodic event, for which the letter-drawing task was appropriate. However, as participants 
in the current study were to engage in up to eighteen episodes of varying content, the letter-drawing 
task would be easily subject to practice effects. Therefore, the current study directly measured 
subjective visual perspective tendencies across the events generated in each condition, to measure the 
average visual perspective representing near and distant future selves.   
 
The following is our primary hypothesis: Event representations cued by distant self-images  
will elicit more observer perspectives than those cued by near future self-images. We also 
hypothesised that events cued by distant versus near future self-images would be less vivid and 
emotionally intense.  
 Finally, thinking about possible future selves inescapably entails comparisons with the 
current self (Markus & Nurius, 1986). Therefore, it was also of interest to compare the self-
statements and related events in the current investigation. In terms of MTT, it was predicted that past 
MTT will elicit more field perspectives than future MTT (e.g., Rathbone et al., 2011). Additionally, 
based on previous findings (see section 1.2), it was predicted that past MTT will be more vivid and 
emotionally intense than future MTT. Finally, as an exploratory measure, we also assessed whether, 
POSSIBLE SELVES AND MTT 
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due to having the least continuity with current selves, distant future self-images will be perceived as 




Participants were a sample of undergraduates attending a university in Yorkshire, England. 
Of the 84 participants who took part, 15 were removed due to insufficient data and one for not 
conforming to the instructions. The final number of participants included in analysis was 68 (Mean 
age=22.60, SD=6.65, Range-18-52). There were 53 females and 15 males. 
 
2.2. Design 
The University Ethics Committee approved this study. Because the aim was to compare how 
individuals perceived their sense of self at three different points in time, a repeated measures design 
was utilised in order to compare individuals’ current, near future and distant future self-
representations. 
 
2.3. Materials and Procedure 
Web links to the tasks were circulated through student email and noticeboards, alongside a 
short description of the study. Participants completed an information and consent page online, 
ensuring them of their anonymity and confidentiality of data. This page also included background 
information and explained 1st and 3rd person perspectives, using descriptions from Libby et al. 
(2005). To not potentially bias the results, participants were not aware of any hypotheses prior to 
completion. Participation was voluntary and no incentives were provided. 
The main instrument used in this study was based on the ‘IAM’ and ‘I Will Be’ (IWB) tasks 
developed by Rathbone et al. (2008, 2011), consisting of three stages. In stage one, participants 
generated a self-image that reflected an enduring aspect of their sense of self by completing the given 
statement (e.g., I am a sister, I will be determined). The IAM task asked participants for two images 
that reflected enduring aspects of their current self, and two ideal self-images per IWB condition 
(IWB-near, IWB-far). IWB conditions necessitated images pertaining to an ideal-self that 
participants would like to be in the future. Thus each participant generated a total of up to six self-
images. As the focus was on changes between selves, it was specified to participants that future 
selves should be different to current selves. As a manipulation check, each self-image statement was 
rated on a 1-7 likert-scale for how much it represented a stable part of the self in question (1 = not at 
all, 7 = very much so), and also how likely it was expected to exist in the future (1 = very unlikely, 7 
= very likely).  
Stage two consisted of using each of the generated self-images to cue three episodes, which 
required participants to provide short event descriptions. For the IAM condition, participants were 
asked for specific events from the emergence of the self-image. Although memories that represented 
the current self (IAM self-images) could be from any prior time, as demonstrated by the ‘clustering’ 
effect in Rathbone et al. (2011), they would likely be fairly recent (e.g., the self-image ‘I am a 
student’ represented by the recent event ‘getting positive feedback for an essay’). For the IWB-near 
and IWB-far conditions, predetermined temporal windows were presented within the instructions (1-
5 and 10-20 years for the near and far conditions respectively). This eliminated temporal overlap and 
ensured that future selves were consistently different between near and far conditions and consisted 
of specific events pertaining to the self-images. Thus each participant could potentially generate 
eighteen total event representations. Following generation of each event, participants specified 




 person perspective. In stage three, 
participants rated the vividness and emotional intensity of events on a 1-7 likert-scale (1 = not at all, 
7 = very much so). After all three stages had been completed, participants would return to stage one 
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to generate a second self-image for that condition. See Figure 1 for a schematic of this process. The 
tasks were presented on an online format utilising SelectSurvey software (https://selectsurvey.net/).  
 
Counterbalancing the order of conditions was considered. However, as people first consider 
the present in order to appraise self-change (Ross, 1989), all participants completed the IAM 
condition before the IWB conditions. The order of IWB conditions was counterbalanced: Half of the 
participants completed IWB-near followed by IWB-far (n=33) and half completed them in the 
reverse order (n=35). There was some normal variation in completion time, approximately averaging 
20 minutes. Finally, a debrief page explained the aims and hypotheses of the study. To ensure 
sufficient data for analysis, a conservative inclusion rule of a minimum of four events per condition 
(with all related ratings) was applied. Participants with < four events for any condition were 
discarded from analysis. Data were analysed using SPSS Version 20. 
 
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
3. RESULTS 
3.1. Characteristics of event representations  
3.1.1. Length of Event Representations 
The number of words used to describe events was greater in the IAM (M=11.43, SD=5.83) 
than IWB-near (M=7.80, SD=4.48), and IWB-far (M=8.10, SD=4.96) conditions. An ANOVA 
showed these were significantly different, F(2, 134)=37.63, p<0.001, partial η2=0.36. Bonferroni 
comparisons showed significant differences between IAM and IWB-near, p<0.001, and IAM and 
IWB-far, p<0.001, but no difference between the two IWB conditions, p>0.05, demonstrating more 
descriptive elaboration for memories than for future events
1
. However, as this study was online, we 
are aware that participants may have taken different amounts of time to describe the events, 
irrespective of text length. 
 
3.1.2. Visual perspective 
Perspectives were classified as 0 for field and 1 for observer. The percentage of observer 
perspectives was calculated for each participant per condition. Observer perspectives were more 
frequently adopted for both IWB conditions (greater for IWB-far versus IWB-near) than the IAM 
condition (see Table 1). As predicted, a repeated measures ANOVA showed significant differences 
in visual perspective between the three conditions, F(2, 134)=10.82, p<0.001, partial η2=0.14, with 
simple comparisons (not corrected for multiple comparisons) showing a significant difference 
between IAM and IWB-near, p<0.005, IAM and IWB-far, p<0.001, both replicating Rathbone et al. 
(2011), and IWB-near and IWB-far, p<0.05. The comparison of the IWB conditions did not survive 
Bonferroni corrections (p=0.126), however, this is a conservative adjustment, and it should be noted 
that all visual perspective effects were in line with our hypotheses. Pearson correlations showed that 
visual perspective was also significantly positively correlated across all conditions, IAM and IWB-
near, r(68)=.39, p<0.01, IAM and IWB-far, r(68)=.26, p<0.05, IWB-near and IWB-far, r(68)=.66, 
p<0.01. This demonstrates significant individual differences were exhibited in regards to visual 
perspective preferences. 
 
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
3.1.3. Vividness 
Vividness was highest in the IAM condition and lowest in the IWB-far condition, a repeated 
measures ANOVA demonstrating significant differences, F(2, 134)=13.40, p<0.001, partial η2=0.17. 
All conditions had significantly different vividness ratings and survived Bonferroni corrections: IAM 
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and IWB-near, p<0.01, IAM and IWB-far, p<0.0005, IWB-near and IWB-far, p<0.05. Thus, 
vividness was greater for past MTT, and the vividness of future MTT significantly declined with 
temporal distance (See Figure 2). It is noteworthy that general vividness levels were high (all above 
mid-point) attesting to the fidelity of the online paradigm to elicit subjectively rich episodes.  
 
3.1.4. Relation between vividness and visual perspective 
Considering that we demonstrated that temporal distance determines the visual perspective of 
future events, it was an open question as to the association between visual perspective and subjective 
event vividness. Exploratory analysis was therefore carried out to determine whether vividness was 
associated with visual perspective for future events. A point biserial correlation was carried out 
between vividness and visual perspective at an event level. Vividness was indeed found to be 
significantly associated with visual perspective, rpb=-.15, N=802, p<0.001. Specifically, events in a 
first-person perspective (N=488, M=5.32, SD=1.45) had higher vividness ratings than those from a 
third-person perspective (N=314, M=4.83, SD=1.66). 
 
INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
3.1.5. Emotional intensity 
In contrast to predictions, there were no significant differences in emotional intensity ratings 
across conditions, F(2, 134)=0.21, p>0.05. As field perspectives are typically associated with greater 
emotional intensity (e.g. D’Argembeau et al., 2003; Nigro & Neisser, 1983), independent t-tests were 
used to compare the emotional intensity of field versus observer perspectives within each condition. 
The emotional intensity of field perspectives versus observer perspectives was significant for both 
future conditions; IWB-near, t(396)=2.18, p<0.05, d=0.07 (field, M=5.21, SD=1.69, observer, 
M=5.09, SD=1.78), and IWB-far, t(400)=2.37, p<0.05, d=0.23 (field, M=5.43, SD=1.67, observer, 
M=5.02, SD=1.83); IAM, t(400)=0.56, p=0.58, d=0.07 (field, M=5.21, SD=1.69, observer, M=5.09, 
SD=1.78). This demonstrates that greater emotional intensity was found for field versus observer 
perspectives only for imagined events and not memories. 
 
3.2. Characteristics of self-images 
The stability check of self-image ratings ensured that participants were imagining their 
current and ideal selves respectively and these were expected to be high on a 1-7 scale (see Method). 
The means for each condition were indeed well above the midpoint: IAM, (M=5.97, SD=0.87), 
IWB-near, (M=6.29, SD=0.66), IWB-far, (M=6.10, SD=0.94). 
 
3.2.1. Content of self-images generated 
To assess the content of the self-images, they were all categorised and tallied, following 
similar methods employed in Rathbone et al (2011). The first author independently categorised the 
self-images of each condition. A subset of self-images (20%; N=81) was also categorised by the 
second author with six discrepancies. After discussion, full agreement was reached. There were few 
specific commonalities for IAM self-images, with most referring to individual attributes (e.g., 
‘strong’, ‘genuine’, ‘forgetful’). The most common were broadly family-member related (15%) (e.g., 
‘sister’, ‘son’, ‘family member’), with all other categories fewer than five percent (e.g., student 4%, 
girlfriend 4%). The most common IWB-near self-images were related to career/work (18%), general 
happiness (10%), and education (8%). The most common IWB-far self-images related to becoming a 
parent (15%), career/work (14%), marriage (9%) and successful (7%). See Appendix A for 
examples. The IWB-far self-images are noticeably similar to the IWBs of Rathbone et al. (2011), in 
which parent, career, and marriage were also the three most common. 
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3.2.2. Types of Self-images: Roles vs. attributes 
As an exploratory measure, related to specific and abstract selves (e.g., Rathbone et al., 
2016), we looked at roles versus attributes for self-images. Each self-image was allocated either a 1 
or 0 to indicate whether it was role-related or attribute-related, with full agreement between the two 
authors for these allocations in a subset (20%; N=81) of responses (See Appendix B for examples). 
The two self-images for each condition were averaged, which gave a proportion for the amount of 
role-related allocations per condition. The proportion of role-related self-images was lowest in the 
IAM condition and highest in the IWB-far condition (See Table 1). A repeated measures ANOVA 
showed that the differences in role allocation between conditions was significant, F(2, 134)=5.89, 
p<0.005, partial η2=0.08. Post-hoc comparisons showed there was no significant difference between 
IAM and IWB-near, p>0.05. There were significant differences between IAM and IWB-far, p<0.001, 
and IWB-near and IWB-far, p<0.05, although the latter of these did not survive the conservative 
Bonferroni corrections (p=0.13). These results demonstrate that distant future self-images were more 
often specified as role-related than current self-images and near future self-images. 
 
3.2.3. Perceived likelihood of self-images 
Related to self-continuity across temporal distance, we assessed the perceived likelihood of 
self-images existing in the future. As Table 1 shows, IWB-far self-images were rated as the least 
likely to exist in the future, and IAMs the most likely. An ANOVA revealed significant differences 
in perceived likelihood ratings between conditions, F(2, 134)=6.82, p<0.005, partial η2=0.09. There 
was no difference between the IWB conditions, p>0.05. However, IAMs were rated significantly 
higher than both IWB-near, p<0.05, and IWB-far self-images, p<0.005 (with Bonferroni 
corrections). This demonstrates that participants perceived their current self-images as more likely to 
exist in the future than near and distant self-images. 
 
3.2.4. Order of IWB conditions 
As the order of IWB conditions was counterbalanced, mixed ANOVAs for the IWB 
conditions (using order of conditions as a between-subjects IV) were carried out for all 
phenomenological ratings. These were non-significant for events’ visual perspective, vividness, 
emotional intensity, and self-images’ role-relatedness (all p>0.05). Interestingly, the order of IWB 
conditions did have an effect on future self-images’ perceived likelihood. F(1, 66)=5.75. p<0.05, 
partial η2=0.08, with a significant interaction between the order of conditions and type of condition, 
F(1, 66)=6.63, p<0.05, partial η2=0.09. The likelihood means were: IWB-near, chronological order 
(M=5.12, SD=1.00), reverse order (M=5.90, SD=0.94); IWB-far, chronological order, (M=5.35, 
SD=1.01), reverse order (M=5.56, SD=0.91). Independent t-tests showed that these differences were 
only significant for IWB-near, t(66)=3.314, p<0.001, d=0.80; IWB-far, p=0.37. These results 
demonstrate that when participants first completed the IWB-far condition, subsequent likelihood 
ratings for IWB-near were significantly greater than if IWB-near was first completed. 
 
4. DISCUSSION 
In this study, we principally investigated the effect of manipulating the temporal distance of 
possible selves upon the visual perspective, vividness and emotional intensity of related episodic 
thoughts. The results of this study replicated findings of Rathbone and colleagues (2011) regarding 
the differences in visual perspective between past and future MTT, and extend their scope to possible 
selves (Markus & Nurius, 1986). Consistent with the proposition that increasing temporal distance 
increases abstract ‘top-down’ cognitive processing (Libby & Eibach., 2011; Trope & Liberman, 
2010), observer perspectives were the predominant perspective for event representations of possible 
selves in the distant versus near future. As a corollary to the core result, the past-future prediction 
was found for vividness but not emotional intensity, although emotion was affected by the visual 
perspective of the event in future MTT. In an exploratory analysis of self-statements, we also 
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replicated the types of self-images generated for future selves (i.e., roles versus attributes) found 
previously (Rathbone et al., 2011; 2016). 
 
4.1. Main findings 
Consistent with construal-level theory (Trope & Liberman, 2010, i.e., that more distant 
objects are perceived as more abstract) and the TEDIFT model (La Corte & Piolino, 2016), 
temporally distant future MTT was less frequently experienced from a field perspective and was less 
vivid than near future MTT. An explanation for this may relate to the frequency of mental 
simulation. For example, it has been demonstrated that repeated retrieval of memories from a field 
versus observer perspective enhances event vividness (e.g. Butler et al., 2016); a similar process of 
rehearsal might be happening for temporally near future events, as they are more likely to be 
represented from a field perspective (cf, Cole & Berntsen, 2016 for results suggesting that goal-
related future events are temporally closer and more frequently rehearsed). In addition, the current 
study demonstrated that field perspectives were associated with increased vividness in future MTT. 
This is consistent with what has been found in studies of memory (e.g., Nigro & Neisser, 1983). 
Future event representations indexed to possible self-images had less elaborate descriptions, 
and were also rated as less vivid than memories indexed to current self-images, independently of 
future temporal distance. This builds upon previous research, in which future MTT is consistently 
less vivid than past MTT (e.g., Berntsen & Bohn, 2010; Cole & Berntsen, 2016). Although the 
remembering-imagining system and the CESH emphasise the similarities between remembering the 
past and imagining the future (Conway et al., 2016; Schacter & Addis, 2007), the findings here do 
not contradict the perspectives emphasising continuity between past and future thought (see 
Michaelian, 2016 for a more thorough philosophical treatment). Furthermore, this study 
demonstrated that observer perspectives increase with temporal distance in future MTT, as they do 
for past MTT (e.g., Rice & Rubin, 2009; Robinson & Swanson, 1993), indicating a possible 
‘mirroring’ of past and future, predicted by the remembering-imagining system (Conway et al., 
2016). However, clearly, a study would have to include a near and far IAM or IWAS conditions (see 
Coste et al., 2015; Rathbone et al., 2008) in addition to an IWB-near and IWB-far condition to fully 
test this hypothesis in one study. 
 
4.2. The content of Self-images 
The most common distant future self-images in the present study, and the future self-images 
in Rathbone et al. (2011), related to ‘becoming a parent’, ‘career’, and ‘marriage’, produced in the 
same rank order of frequency in both studies. The relevant distinction is that in Rathbone et al. 
(2011) the selves were open-ended, whereas the present study examined ideal selves. This finding 
represents a well-founded natural positivity bias for future thinking (e.g., MacLeod & Conway, 2007, 
Rasmussen & Berntsen, 2013) and appears independent of whether participants are specifically asked 
for positive self-images. One open question is the relation between the possible selves that 
individuals would like to be (‘ideal’), and the possible selves individuals feel they should be 
(‘ought’) (Higgins, 1987). Future studies could uncover any commonalities between these.  
The life script hypothesis (Berntsen & Rubin, 2002), considering autobiographical memory to 
be organised by semantic knowledge of culturally shared life events, can further explain these self-
images. Cultural life script events are (generally) positive events that are expected to occur at given 
times during one’s lifetime within a specific cultural context (Berntsen & Rubin, 2004), and have 
been shown to structure past and future thinking (Berntsen & Rubin, 2004; Berntsen & Bohn, 2010; 
Berntsen & Jacobsen, 2008; Bohn & Berntsen, 2011). Because participants in both the current study 
and Rathbone et al. (2011) have likely not experienced their culturally expected events, the basis for 
their future self-images are probably culturally-expected (cf. Table 3, Berntsen & Rubin, 2004). 
Hence, due to commonalities in future self-images, it is suggested that both the standard I Will Be 
task developed by Rathbone and colleagues (e.g., Chessel et al., 2014; Di Simplicio et al., 2015; 
Rathbone et al., 2011, 2016) and the modified task used in the present study, tap positive culturally-
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expected life events. This suggests that future studies can flexibly probe ideal selves within the IWB 
task by using it as an independent variable (i.e., comparing with IAMs) or dependent variable (i.e., 
measuring its schematic content). It is noteworthy that where future events can map on to actual 
experience (e.g., ordering a pizza), scripts and schemas might still be relevant for future scenarios, as 
future versus past scenarios tend to be more prototypical (Kane, Van Boven & McGraw, 2012). 
In a recent study, Rathbone et al. (2016) demonstrated that specific (versus abstract) possible 
self-images were dated as emerging in the more distant (versus near) future. Our results are 
consistent with this, in that we found fewer attributes (cf. abstract self-images) and greater roles (cf. 
specific self-images) generated for distant versus near future self-images when they were explicitly 
manipulated. Rathbone et al. (2016) explained that, although this appears counter to construal-level 
theory (Trope & Liberman, 2010), it can be explained by distant self-images mapping on to cultural 
life scripts; replicated herein. Additionally, it is possible that when thinking of the near future, 
participants draw upon already present aspects of self, such as ubiquitous attributes (e.g., being 
caring, which can be present across multiple aspects of self; see Donahue et al., 1993; McConnell, 
2010). 
 
4.3. The relation between visual perspective and theories pertaining to the self 
Research has implicated observer perspectives as a potential disconnecting mechanism between 
the current self and other selves (e.g., McIsaac & Eich, 2002; McNamara et al., 2005; see the 
dispassionate observer hypothesis, Sutin & Robins, 2008). This might apply when visual perspective 
is manipulated, or during traumatic memory recall (e.g., McIsaac & Eich, 2004). In contrast, field 
perspectives might function in connecting current and possible future selves using a more subjective 
self-awareness (see Prebble et al., 2013 and Introduction). According to Libby and Eibach (2011), of 
greater influence is whether one’s focus is on experiencing the details of the event (preference for 
field), or on coherence with one’s self-concept (preference for observer). Nevertheless, observer 
perspectives are indeed superior for assessing self-change (Libby et al., 2005). Thus, in the context of 
the present findings, the near and far future selves lent themselves to different visual perspectives: 
There was a greater focus on subjective event ‘experiencing’ for near possible selves via a field 
perspective, but when cued by temporally differentiated future selves, a greater change is implied 
between one’s current and future self which led to more role-based self-images, leading to an 
observer perspective. Our results are therefore broadly consistent with proposals by Libby and 
Eibach (2011) and the dispassionate observer hypothesis (Sutin & Robins, 2008); that temporally 
distant, but not temporally near future scenarios, are subjectively distanced from our current self 
using an observer perspective. 
As stated previously, herein we studied objective-present self and objective temporally-
extended self via IAMs and I Will Be cues respectively, and the subjective temporally-extended self 
was probed in the EFT task. In mapping Libby & Eibach’s (2011) model onto the sense of self model 
(Prebble et al., 2013) one could hypothesise that the field perspective aids subjective self-awareness, 
whereas the observer perspective aids objective self-knowledge (e.g., personal semantics, see La 
Corte & Piolino, 2016). One might also suspect that one’s on-going subjective experience (subjective 
present self) - altered in disorders such as Schizophrenia - may affect the vantage perspectives 
adopted for one’s current and future selves. These are intriguing hypotheses, which can be explored 
in future work.   
 
4.4. Perceived likelihood: Order effects 
Although distant possible selves logically have the least continuity with current selves, there 
was no difference between the perceived likelihood of self-images existing in the future between the 
two future conditions
2
. As mentioned, distant self-images were highly related to cultural life scripts, 
thus their perceived future likelihood may be inherently greater as they are culturally expected to be 
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attained. It is important, however, to mention the order effect that impacted the perceived likelihood 
of near future self-images; when individuals first imagined distant possible selves, near possible 
selves had greater perceived likelihood than the opposite order. We suggest that this order effect is 
due to a broader cognitive contrast effect (e.g., Cogan et al., 2013; Thornton & Moore, 1993): For 
instance, if one was to imagine a distant future goal (e.g., completing a marathon), the subsequent 





Additionally, the future condition order had no effect on any other phenomenological 
measure. This may be useful for future interventions. For instance, several studies have examined the 
effect of imagining a desired possible self upon present behaviour (e.g., Epstein, 1980; Hagger et al., 
2012; Leondari et al., 1998; Oyserman et al., 2006, 2007). Perhaps future investigations could 
explore the order effect of near and far ideal self-images upon positive health behaviours, such as 
reducing alcohol intake, or giving up smoking. 
 
4.5. Future directions 
Although emotional memories are more frequently accompanied by field perspectives (e.g., 
D’Argembeau et al., 2003), in the present study, field perspectives were only accompanied by 
increased emotional intensity when MTT was future-directed. However, the present study did not 
limit or manipulate valence of episodic memories (plus all mean emotional intensity ratings were 
positive). One tentative hypothesis is that field perspectives act as a mechanism for (emotionally) 
connecting current selves to possible selves. Therefore, prompting to use a field perspective in IWB 
tasks might be especially useful for identifying, and connecting to, ideal-selves. 
Virtual reality might provide further assistance to this potential line of research. For example, 
people with a larger actual-ideal self-discrepancy are more motivated to play immersive video games 
with ideal-self-related experiences (Przybylski et al., 2011), and self-related future avatars can elicit 
positive attitudes toward behavioural change (Kim & Sundar, 2012; Song et al. 2013). Future 
thoughts are inherently more constructive than memories (Conway et al., 2016). Thus, synthetically 
experiencing ideal-self event representations, with increased immersion in virtual reality using a field 
perspective, may increase ideal self-image feasibility; or at least reduce actual-ideal self-discrepancy, 
which could promote wellbeing (Higgins, 1987). Nevertheless, the question of whether field or 
observer perspectives are more effective in virtual reality remains an empirical question. 
Additionally, in order to compare more diverse possible selves across time, future studies 
could utilise both between-groups and repeated measures designs. Including a possible self that 
opposes the ideal-self, an undesired/feared-self (Markus & Nurius, 1986), would potentially further 
illuminate the role of possible selves in MTT, and how MTT is temporally organised around more 
abstract and stable (past and future) self-images (e.g. Chessel et al., 2014; Rathbone et al., 2008, 
2011, 2016). Finally, it is worthy of note that our study was entirely administered online, which 
arguably lacks experimental control when compared with laboratory-based studies. However, key 
studies using the self-images task (Rathbone et al., 2008; 2016) were also administered online, with 
others administered using questionnaires with presumably little or no experimenter prompting, 
similar to an online administration (Rathbone et al., 2011). 
4.6. Conclusions 
The primary question of the current study was whether the visual perspective of event 
representations bound to possible selves was related to their temporal distance. With increasing 
temporal distance, future events more often involved an observer perspective. Theoretically, the 
current study integrated these findings within a diverse literature on visual perspective (Libby & 
Eibach, 2011), temporal distance (Trope & Liberman, 2010) and broader models of future thinking 
(La Corte & Piolino, 2016) and sense of self (Prebble, Addis & Tippett, 2013). The latter model 
encapsulated well the levels of knowledge used within the modified IWB task used in the current 
study, illustrating the relevance of these findings to current theoretical frameworks. The current study 
has demonstrated clearly that the possible self is a useful and testable aspect of human psychology 
that relates to self-salient, culturally-influenced, future events. Finally, the possible pragmatic utility 
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of visual perspectives in increasing positive behaviour and wellbeing is highlighted as a fruitful area 
for future investigation. 
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1. The data were not normally distributed across all measures. Non-parametric equivalents were also carried 
out, which yielded the same results. 
2. For a potential explanation of why near and distant possible self-images were both perceived as less likely 
to exist in the future in contrast to current selves, see the end of history illusion (Quoidbach et al., 
2013). 
3. Although the likelihood ratings for IWB-far demonstrated the opposite result (lower likelihood ratings 
when imagined in chronological order), this did not reach significance. 
 
  




Figure 1.  Schematic of the different stages involved in completing IAM and IWB self-images 
 
Figure 2. Participants’ mean vividness ratings as a function of self-image condition. Error bars 
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Tables 
Table 1.  





I am I Will Be (Near) I Will Be (Far) 
Event Representations    
Observer Perspectives (%) 24.02 (26.92)^ 35.66 (31.46)^* 42.75 (36.22)^* 
Vividness (1-7) 5.63 (0.89)^ 5.28 (1.08)^* 5.00 (1.29)^* 
Emotional Intensity (1-7) 5.18 (1.09) 5.19 (1.30) 5.26 (1.27) 
 
Self-Images    
Perceived likelihood (1-7) 







^ indicates a significant difference between the I am and one or both of the I Will Be conditions (at 
the .05 level) 
*indicates a significant difference between the I Will Be near and far conditions (at the .05 level) 
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Appendices 
Appendix A. Example self-images and event representations 
Condition Self-image Related event representations 
IAM (Family member) - I 
am a sister 
1. Visiting my sister on her birthdays and giving her 
gifts 
2. Spending my free time with her and helping her with 
tidying 
3. Arguments with my sister 
4. helping my little sister with her homework 
5. Me and my brother got matching tattoos for my 21st  
birthday 
IWB-near (Happy) - I will be 
happy 
1. Meeting someone romantically 
2. I have helped a friend with their issues 
3. I will have my friends and family around me 
4. Buying my own house 
5. I will go on holiday 
IWB-far (Becoming a parent) 
- I will be a mother  
1. Giving birth 
2. When I see my child for the first time 
3. Holding my own baby 
4. Smiling and teaching the baby 
5. My partner playing sports with the child 
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Appendix B. Prototypical examples of roles and attributes for self-images 
Condition Roles Attributes 










IWB-near In a job I love 
A qualified accountant 
A doctor 
A university graduate 
An Occupational Therapist 
Organised 
Happy 
Calm 
Optimistic 
Content 
IWB-far Married 
A mother 
A professor 
A teacher 
A father 
Wiser 
Sociable 
Successful 
Charitable 
Relaxed 
 
 
 
 
 
